Education markets and schools’ mechanisms of exclusion: the case of Chile by Zancajo, Adrian
Journal website: http://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/   Manuscript received: 10/31/2018 
Facebook: /EPAAA  Revisions received: 6/2/2019 
Twitter: @epaa_aape  Accepted: 6/3/2019 
 
Special Issue  
Globalization, Privatization, Marginalization: 
Assessing Connections in/through Education 
 
education policy analysis 
archives 
A peer-reviewed, independent,  
open access, multilingual journal  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Arizona State University 
 
Volume 27 Number 130      October 21, 2019 ISSN 1068-2341 
 
 
Education Markets and Schools’ Mechanisms of Exclusion: 
The Case of Chile1 
Adrián Zancajo 
University of Glasgow 
United Kingdom	
 
Citation: Zancajo, A. (2019). Education markets and schools’ mechanisms of exclusion: The case of 
Chile. Education Policy Analysis Archives, 27(130). https://doi.org/10.14507/epaa.27.4318 This article 
is part one of a special issue, Globalization, Privatization, Marginalization: Assessing Connections 
in/through Education, Part 2, guest edited by D. Brent Edwards and Alex Means. 
 
Abstract: Education market advocates frequently argue that socioeconomically disadvantaged  
students could be the main beneficiaries of privatization and market policies. However, the 
international evidence has shown how privatization and pro-market policies have a negative 
impact in terms of equity, which particularly affect socioeconomically disadvantaged 
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populations, increase school segregation and stratification, and foster educational inequalities. 
The main objective of this paper is to analyze how the responses developed by educational 
providers in marketized environments especially impact poor populations and can act as 
mechanisms of exclusion. In this context, Chile is an optimal case study due to the extreme 
version of privatization and market policies it adopted four decades ago. Based on the case 
study of two municipalities in Chile, which represent two local education markets, the 
presented evidence combines in-depth interviews with school principals and families. The 
paper analyses how schools’ responses in the context of a competitive environment produce, 
among other effects, processes of exclusion affecting students from low socioeconomic 
backgrounds, foster school segregation and increase educational inequalities. Finally, the 
paper elaborates on the limits of education markets and privatization policies, as well as 
market regulation reforms, in providing better educational opportunities to socioeconomically 
disadvantaged students.  
Keywords: privatization; educational equity; Chile  
 
Mercados educativos y dispositivos de exclusión de las escuelas: El caso de Chile 
Resumen: Los defensores del mercado educativo con frecuencia argumentan que los 
estudiantes socialmente más desfavorecidos podrían ser los principales beneficiarios de las 
políticas de privatización y de mercado. Sin embargo, la evidencia internacional ha 
demostrado cómo las políticas de privatización y pro-mercado tienen un impacto negativo en 
términos de equidad, el cual afecta especialmente a la población socioeconómicamente más 
desfavorecida, aumenta la segregación y la estratificación escolar, y fomentan las 
desigualdades educativas. El principal objetivo de este artículo es analizar cómo las respuestas 
desarrolladas por los proveedores educativos en entornos de mercado afectan especialmente a 
las poblaciones pobres y pueden actuar como mecanismos de exclusión. En este contexto, 
Chile es un óptimo caso de estudio debido a la versión extrema de privatización y políticas de 
mercado que adoptó hace cuatro décadas. Basado en los estudios de caso de dos municipios 
de Chile, que representan dos mercados educativos locales, la evidencia presentada combina 
entrevistas en profundidad con directores de escuelas y familias. El artículo analiza cómo las 
respuestas de las escuelas en un entorno competitivo producen, entre otros efectos, procesos 
de exclusión que afectan a estudiantes de bajo nivel socioeconómico, fomentan la segregación 
escolar y aumentan las desigualdades educativas. Finalmente, el documento reflexiona en 
torno a los límites de los mercados educativos y las políticas de privatización, así como las 
reformas de la regulación del mercado, para brindar mejores oportunidades educativas a los 
estudiantes socialmente más desfavorecidos. 
Palabras-clave: privatización; equidad educativa; Chile  
 
Mercados educativos e dispositivos de exclusão das escolas: O caso do Chile 
Resumo: Os defensores do mercado educacional frequentemente argumentam que os 
estudantes socialmente desfavorecidos podem ser os principais beneficiários das políticas de 
privatização e de mercado. No entanto, a evidência internacional tem mostrado como as 
políticas de privatização e pró-mercado têm um impacto negativo sobre o capital próprio, que 
afeta especialmente as populações socioeconomicamente desfavorecidas, aumentando a 
segregação e estratificação escolar, e promover as desigualdades educacionais . O principal 
objetivo deste artigo é analisar como as respostas desenvolvidas pelos provedores de 
educação nos ambientes de mercado afetam especialmente as populações pobres e podem 
atuar como mecanismos de exclusão. Nesse contexto, o Chile é um excelente estudo de caso 
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devido à versão extrema das políticas de privatização e de mercado que adotou há quatro 
décadas. Com base em estudos de caso de dois municípios no Chile, que representam dois 
mercados educacionais locais, as evidências apresentadas combinam entrevistas em 
profundidade com diretores de escolas e de famílias. O artigo analisa como respostas de 
escolas em um ambiente competitivo produzir, entre outros efeitos, processos de exclusão 
que afetam os estudantes de baixo nível socioeconômico, a segregação escolar incentivar e 
aumentar as desigualdades educacionais. Finalmente, o documento reflete sobre os limites 
dos mercados educacionais e das políticas de privatização, bem como as reformas de 
regulação do mercado, para proporcionar melhores oportunidades educacionais aos 
estudantes socialmente desfavorecidos. 
Palavras-chave: privatização; equidade educacional; Chile 
 
Introduction 
In the last three decades, many countries have experienced an increase in the involvement of 
private providers in basic education, as well as an important expansion of pro-market education 
policies (Rizvi, 2016). The data available show that private enrollment in primary and secondary 
education has grown dramatically over the last three decades, particularly in low- and middle-income 
countries (Verger, Fontdevila, & Zancajo, 2016a). At the same time, many national education 
systems have adopted pro-market policies in education, essentially promoting school choice and 
competition between schools (Musset, 2012; Waslander, Pater, & Weide, 2010). Despite other 
possible benefits regarding effectiveness and efficiency, education privatization and market policies 
advocates have frequently argued that poor students could be the main beneficiaries from the 
adoption of these reforms. In many cases, the equity argument is part of the discourses defending 
the involvement of private actors in education and the adoption of market mechanisms.   
For education privatization and market advocates, traditional state education systems limit 
the capacity of poor students to access high-quality schools since their school choice options are 
restricted and schools do not have appropriate incentives to improve their educational quality, due to 
the lack competition between them. In this context, increasing the capacity of choice for students 
and families, promoting competition between schools and facilitating the capacity of private 
institutions to deliver educational services are presented as feasible policy solutions for improving the 
educational opportunities of socioeconomically disadvantaged students (Patrinos, Barrera-Osorio, & 
Guáqueta, 2009). However, the empirical evidence has shown that education privatization and 
market policies have a negative impact on equity and particularly affect poor students (Waslander et 
al., 2010). Market policies and the involvement of private actors in education provision seem to be 
related to socioeconomic school segregation and stratification phenomena (Alegre & Ferrer, 2010; 
Elacqua, 2012; Fiske & Ladd, 2001; OECD, 2012a; Reay, 2004; Valenzuela, Bellei, & de los Ríos, 
2014). Therefore, there is an apparent paradox between the ontology of privatization and pro-market 
policies regarding equity and their effects, according to the available evidence. The context in which 
these policies are implemented and the way in which educational actors enact market mechanisms 
can shed some light on this paradox.  
Beyond the impact evaluations that identify the negative effects in terms of equity, 
particularly for socioeconomically disadvantaged students, the research needs to explore why and 
how marketization and privatization policies produce processes of segregation, exclusion or 
marginalization. Much of the research on the dynamics of education markets has focused on the 
demand side. In this sense, research concerning different contexts and on different policy designs 
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has shown that families and students do not enact market policies, mainly in the form of school 
choice, in the same way. Different studies have demonstrated how school choice processes are highly 
influenced by social class (Ball, 2003; Gewirtz, Ball, & Bowe, 1995). For example, middle- and upper-
class families tend to manage high levels information, while lower-class families are faced with more 
economic restrictions and geographical and cultural barriers. As a result, the patterns of school 
choice are socially segmented, which partly explains the different results of privatization and market 
policies among advantaged and disadvantaged social groups. That said, how the incentives that 
schools face and the behaviors that they develop to respond to the competitive environment 
contribute to the exclusion of poor students has been relatively under-analyzed in the academic 
literature (Waslander et al., 2010). Beyond school student selection practices developed in some 
market contexts, responses in other dimensions, such as school diversification or external 
communication, have been identified as possible means to exclude most disadvantaged students. On 
the other hand, compared to the research carried out for the demand-side of the market, schools’ 
rationalities, motivations, logics of action and mechanisms are still under-researched areas, 
particularly in relation to their capacity to generate educational exclusion.  
This paper contributes to the analysis of how, through which mechanisms and under what 
motivations and rationalities, schools exposed to marketized environments can contribute to an 
increase in educational inequalities. This is essential in order to be able to accurately assess the 
capacity of regulation and compensatory policies to reduce the socioeconomic stratification among 
schools. This objective entails the identification of the main responses developed by schools in the 
process of education market enactment and the analysis of how these responses might exclude the 
most socioeconomically disadvantaged students. Based on the vast  evidence on the Chilean 
education system, which demonstrates the negative impact of the education market on inequalities, 
this article seeks to open the ‘black box’ by identifying which supply-side mechanisms can explain 
these negative effects. The Chilean case is particularly interesting since in 2015 the government 
passed a legal reform, under the name Inclusion Law2 which, among other issues, prohibits the most 
relevant and explicit practices producing social exclusion such as cost-sharing and students selection. 
Although it is still early to assess the impact of this legal reform, it is important to note that during 
the political debate, this law faced important resistance from right-wing political parties but also from 
private subsidized schools and families (Bellei, 2016). This resistance demonstrates the extent to 
which exclusion practices are rooted in the dynamics of the Chilean education system on both the 
supply and demand sides, and makes Chile a standout case to analyze the role of the supply-side 
when it comes to exclusion mechanisms.       
The article is structured as follows. The first section reviews the main assumptions and the 
theory of change in privatization and market policies with a particular focus on the expected effects 
on equity and poor students. Second, some of the main characteristics of the Chilean case are 
presented, as well as evidence of school segregation and educational inequalities. Third, the research 
methodology and the data collection process are briefly explained. Fourth, the main findings of the 
research are summarized, highlighting how different schools’ responses to the education market can 
act as mechanisms of exclusion and increase school segregation and educational inequalities. Finally, 
the main conclusions of the research are presented and the capacity of privatization and market 
policies to provide educational opportunities to poor students is discussed in light of the results 
obtained in the Chilean case. 
 
 
2 Ley de Inclusión Escolar (20.845) in Spanish.  
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Education Markets and Equity: Between Theory and Evidence 
Education privatization and market-oriented reforms are adopted under different 
circumstances and rationalities. The supposed superiority of the private sector, the ‘public education 
in crisis’ narrative, the need for school supply diversification and economic efficiency arguments are 
commonly used to promote and justify the adoption of privatization and market reforms (Verger et 
al., 2016a). However, market reforms in education have also frequently been adopted and justified as 
a way to improve the educational opportunities of the poor and minority groups (e.g., immigrants, 
black students or linguistic and religious minorities; Lubienski, 2005; Lubienski, Weitzel, & 
Lubienski, 2009). In some contexts, the main pressures for the adoption of school choice and 
privatization policies even come from the most socioeconomically disadvantaged populations or 
minorities, who see, in market solutions and private schools, a means to expand their educational 
opportunities or meet their specific educational needs (Harris, Herrington, & Albee, 2007; Walford, 
2013). However, critics of pro-market reforms have warned that these policies may not improve the 
situation of poor students, but rather amplify the existing level of inequalities (Apple, 2001; Belfield 
& Levin, 2009; Ladd, 2002). 
Although privatization and market mechanisms are not new ideas in education, they have 
been disseminated across the globe in the last two decades, particularly by International 
Organizations, non-state international actors and national development aid agencies. As Rizvi (2016) 
points out, globalization has contributed to the rapid expansion of these policies worldwide and 
particularly in middle- and low-income countries. Usually these policies are presented as a feasible 
solution for southern countries trying to expand access or to improve the quality of  primary and 
secondary education. In some cases, this is an attempt to achieve the objectives of the past 
Education for All (EFA) framework, or of the current education Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs; Srivastava, 2010). In this case, the capacity of these policies not just to provide access and 
improve quality but also to increase equity, particularly regarding the incorporation  of traditionally 
marginalized populations to the education system, is a frequent argument used by International 
Organizations. For example, the 2020 World Bank Education Strategy establishes equity 
improvement as one of the main objectives and at the same time considers partnerships with the 
private sector as one desirable policy option to achieve this objective (Verger & Bonal, 2011; World 
Bank, 2011). Beyond the involvement of the private sector, pro-market policies in education, such as 
school choice and competition, have been also broadly disseminated on a global level by IOs and 
other international actors. Nowadays, it is possible to affirm that market solutions are part of the 
global education agenda (Ball, 2012; Ball & Youdell, 2008). However, the global expansion of 
privatization and market mechanisms in education has been related to the increase of inequalities in 
southern countries and in particular to the exclusion and marginalization of most socioeconomically 
disadvantaged populations. For example, Macpherson, Robertson, and Walford (2014) analyze 
different case studies of education privatization in southern countries showing, among other 
concerns, that in many cases the advance of this phenomenon does not necessarily increase the 
opportunities of most socioeconomically disadvantaged students but has in fact generated processes 
of exclusion and marginalization of these populations. Similar results regarding equity are shown by 
Ndimande and Lubienski (2017), in this case particularly focusing on the effects of the adoption of 
market mechanisms in education and combing case studies from northern and southern countries. 
Ndimande and Lubienski (2017) consider that market mechanisms and privatization do not 
necessarily improve the educational opportunities of marginalized children in the countries analyzed 
and also can perpetuate and increase educational inequalities. 
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Although equity-based arguments are frequently used by privatization advocates, it is not 
easy to identify a clear theory of change in terms of how these policies could improve the educational 
opportunities of socioeconomically disadvantaged students. In fact, privatization and market 
initiatives are typically justified as a way to overcome the supposed failures of state intervention or 
‘democratic control’ in education, rather than by emphasizing the inherent benefits of these 
interventions. This line of argument is also applied to the case of equity. For example, Tooley (1996) 
defends the equality capacity of education pro-market solutions as alternatives to the inequalities 
created by state intervention, which, for the author, are “an inevitable consequence of the middle-
classes ‘muscling in’ on welfare, using the state to provide for their needs, at the expense of the 
poor” (Tooley, 1996, p. 63). In the same sense, the seminal pro-market education proposal, Politics, 
Markets, and America’s Schools (Chubb & Moe, 1990), is also based on the need to overcome the 
supposed intrinsic pathologies of state education systems, especially their incapacity to provide 
educational opportunities to socioeconomically disadvantaged students, who are normally 
concentrated in underperforming schools (Neal, 2002).  
Although there is no specific equity focus on the proposals of education “market theory” 
(Lubienski, 2006a), the review of the main assumptions behind the adoption of privatization and 
market policies in education permits us to identify how the proponents of these policies forecast  
that poor populations could benefit from the application of its principles. In this regard, there are 
two main sets of arguments: one related to the demand side and the other to the supply side. 
Regarding the demand side, for education market proponents, increasing families’ choice options, 
through school choice policies and vouchers schemes, is a way to provide them with real capacity to 
exercise “exit” (Hirschman, 1970), i.e., leaving underperforming or low-quality schools, and accessing 
schools previously restricted to them, because of economic barriers or the presence of more 
restrictive catchment areas (Hoxby, 2003). In this respect, Moe (2008) affirms that the increase in 
school choice capacity particularly benefits the poor, who, unlike middle- and upper-class families, 
do not have other options to increase the educational opportunities available to  their children. 
In practice, this means that parents with money can escape the trap by changing 
their residence or going private, but poor parents cannot. Thus, a major 
advantage of choice is that it expands the opportunities of parents who are in 
greatest need and who currently have little or no control over their children’s 
educations. (Moe, 2008, p. 565) 
 
As the above quote suggests, the main objective regarding equity among market proponents is not to 
establish compensatory measures or provide additional options to students from low socioeconomic 
backgrounds, but to ‘level the playing field’ by reducing the barriers facing  these students trying to 
access better schools (Musset, 2012). In fact, for Moe (2002), providing equal opportunities for poor 
and non-poor students through initiatives such as vouchers and school choice “will tilt the playing 
field in favor of the disadvantaged and aggressively promote the cause of social equity” (Moe, 2002, 
p. 180). Within this framework, it is assumed that families and students, regardless of their 
socioeconomic status (SES), will manage the necessary information for choosing better-quality 
schools and act in line with instrumental rationality, based on educational quality, when it comes to 
choosing a school for their children. Those who are skeptical about these assumptions argue that 
families do not have access to the same information (Elacqua & Fábrega, 2006); that families from 
different social backgrounds do not have the same skills to interpret and analyze this information 
(Ambler, 1994; Gewirtz et al., 1995); that school choice is not always guided by instrumental 
rationality (Ben-Porath, 2009; Bonal, Verger, & Zancajo, 2017); or that families’ school preferences 
are socially influenced (Ball, 2003; Schneide, Teske, & Marschall., 2000).  
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Another set of arguments used by pro-market advocates to defend the equity benefits of 
education markets refers to the supply side of the market. It is claimed that the adoption of policies, 
such as school choice and per capita funding schemes (i.e., vouchers), will force schools to operate 
according to the rules of competition (Belfield & Levin, 2002). It is precisely this competitive 
environment that will provide the necessary incentives to schools to deliver a quality education for 
all, or conversely force them to exit the market due to a lack of demand and financial resources. This 
environment of competition should provide schools with “strong incentives to move toward the 
kinds of ‘effective-school’ organizations” (Chubb & Moe, 1990, p. 190). In other words, in an 
education system coordinated by state intervention and not by market, low-quality schools are only 
able to operate because of a lack of competitive incentives. However, competition, based mainly on 
per capita funding, provides schools with the necessary motivation to improve the quality of their 
education; otherwise, being unable to attract students, they are be forced to exit the market.  
However, different scholars have pointed out that schools do not necessarily respond to 
market incentives as education market theory expects. Two main approaches have been useful in 
understanding why schools in a competitive environment do not develop the expected responses and 
therefore fail to improve the educational opportunities of socioeconomically disadvantaged students 
or even increase educational inequalities. First, there is the fact that schools in competitive 
environments do not necessarily perceive competition in the same way and therefore do not develop 
the expected responses, for example, in terms of improving the quality of education. In this context, 
it is important to distinguish between structural competition and perceived competition. While 
structural competition refers to the existence of alternative options in the market, perceived 
competition entails the extent to which and how schools perceive these alternative options as direct 
competitors (Jabbar, 2015; Kasman & Loeb, 2013). Frequently, the adoption of market mechanisms 
does not necessarily translate into a high perception of competition (Zimmer & Buddin, 2009). In 
fact, in market environments schools’ perceived competition is often lower than structural 
competition, with some schools even able to develop responses to avoid competition (Leviacic, 
2004). Consequently, the adoption of market policies seems to be an insufficient condition for 
providing the necessary incentives to schools in order to significantly alter their pedagogical and 
management practices.  
The second approach, which tries to explain why schools do not always respond to market 
policies as the theory expects, is based on the economic theory of monopolistic competition 
(Lubienski, 2006b). Monopolistic competition (Chamberlin, 1933; Robinson, 1933) refers to a 
situation where providers are not able to compete using price and therefore need to differentiate 
their products through other features. In the case of education, and particularly basic education, the 
capacity to offer a substantially different product to that of other providers in the educational market 
is relatively limited. In most education systems, regardless of the presence of market policies, the 
curriculum of basic education is strongly regulated by the state, which means the capacity of schools 
to develop substantive changes in curricular terms is limited. In the context of the education market 
where: a) the exchanged good is relatively homogeneous, b) the margin of action with respect to 
price is limited, and c) there is a large number of suppliers, frequently resulting in attempts by 
schools to differentiate themselves through attributes of symbolic nature. These are not necessarily 
transferred to the daily activity of schools and marketing practices  are especially important when 
emphasizing these symbolic aspects, which do not necessarily have an impact in terms of the quality 
of education (Lubienski, 2006b). 
Despite the fact that the demand side of the market (students and families) and particularly 
socioeconomically disadvantaged populations do not necessarily respond as market advocates expect, 
the incentives that schools offer do not necessarily translate into gains in terms of equity. As 
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Lubienski (2006a) states, “market forces may in fact provide disincentives for schools to focus on the 
equity considerations of diverse learning styles and difficult-to-educate students” (p. 25). In this 
sense, socioeconomically disadvantaged students are especially affected by what van Zanten (2009) 
refers to as first- and second-order competition. While first-order competition involves incentives 
that schools offer to attract a large number of students, second-order competition takes place when 
schools try to attract the most academically able students, since they cost less to educate. 
The Case of Chile: Privatization, Marketization and Inequalities 
Historically, Chile has been well known as one of the most market-oriented education 
systems in the world (Bellei & Vanni, 2015). Since the reforms adopted during the 1980s, in the 
context of the military dictatorship led by Augusto Pinochet, the Chilean education system has been 
characterized by the presence of a universal voucher scheme, total freedom of school choice and 
high levels of school competition (Cox, 2003; Gauri, 1998; Mizala, 2007). The most direct and visible 
effects of the reforms adopted during the 1980s have been the emergence of private subsidized 
schools and an increase in enrollment in private institutions. Private enrollment has risen 
dramatically, from 15.1% in 1981 to 61.2% in 2017 (Centro de Estudios Mineduc, 2017; Verger, 
Bonal, & Zancajo, 2016b). Nowadays, around 90% of students in primary and secondary education 
are enrolled in schools funded through the voucher system (Paredes & Ugarte, 2011). On the other 
hand, private schools are allowed to operate on a for-profit basis and, since the mid-1990s, private 
subsidized schools have been allowed to charge families mandatory fees (Elacqua, Montt, & Santos, 
2013)3. The Chilean education system has also developed a strong information system, which is 
mainly based on the national performance assessment (SIMCE). This information system 
accomplishes two main roles: it provides information to families regarding school choice processes 
and it informs accountability devices (Bravo, 2011; Falabella, 2015). Finally, another important 
feature of the Chilean case is that market rules in education have remained relatively stable for more 
than 30 years, which means that both demand (i.e., families and students) and supply (i.e., schools) 
sides are familiar with and able to operate in a market environment.  
 From a global perspective, the Chilean case plays a relevant role because it represents 
the most extreme version of an education market or an ‘authentic’ market (Tooley, 1996). Since the 
adoption of the market education reform in the 1980s, Chile has been traditionally considered by 
market advocates as an example to follow of a country adopting a universal voucher scheme and 
promoting school competition. However, since 2006, with the massive student and civil society 
mobilizations against the high level of educational inequalities, Chile has become a case that 
exemplifies the unintended consequences of privatization and pro-market policies in education, 
especially in terms of equity.  
After more than three decades of market policies in education, there is a relative academic 
consensus that the reforms adopted to promote the involvement of private providers in the 
provision of education, competition between schools and significant levels of school choice have 
produced little or null effects in terms of academic performance or educational quality (see Bellei 
[2007] for a review of the existing studies). Nevertheless, some authors point out that the 
 
 
3 Recently, the Chilean government approved an important educational reform that prohibits student 
selection, eliminates school fees in publicly funded schools and does not allow schools to operate on a for-
profit basis (Bellei, 2016). Regarding the contents of this research, the fieldwork and the collection data were 
developed before the approval of the reform.  
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compensatory policies developed during the 1990s4 have improved the results of schools with the 
lowest academic performance (e.g., rural schools and public schools situated in poor contexts; Bellei, 
2003; Cox, 2003). However, the Chilean education system is characterized by high levels of school 
segregation and educational inequalities. In fact, international comparisons show that Chile has the 
lowest level of school social inclusion5 and one of the highest levels of school segregation among 
OECD countries (OECD, 2016; Valenzuela, 2008). This progressive process of school 
socioeconomic stratification can be mainly explained as a consequence of a process of concentrating 
most socioeconomically disadvantaged students in public schools, which followed the middle-class 
flight to private schools in recent decades (Elacqua, 2012; Villalobos & Valenzuela, 2012).  
Beyond the ethical or social justice concerns about the unequal distribution of students, 
school segregation has also fostered a “socioeconomic stratification of achievement” (Mizala & 
Torche, 2012), increasing the differences in academic performance between private and public 
schools and between different SES groups of students (Mizala & Romaguera, 2000). That said, how 
the school segregation of socioeconomically disadvantaged students works in Chile is a complex 
phenomenon. While students with a low SES are mainly enrolled in public schools, their level of 
segregation is greater in the private subsidized sector (Elacqua, 2012). On the other hand, this 
relationship between privatization and market reforms and inequalities goes beyond the academic 
performance of students. Torche (2005) examines how educational opportunities, related to the 
possible attainment of a specific educational level, have evolved in recent decades, which 
demonstrates how inequalities have increased among the age cohorts directly affected by the 
privatization reforms adopted during the 1980s. While there is no direct impact evaluation of the 
1980s reforms on equity issues, such as school segregation and stratification, the available evidence 
seems to point to a negative relationship between privatization reforms and inequalities (OECD, 
2004). The relationship between market policies and school segregation transcends the national scale, 
for example, Valenzuela et al. (2014) observe that higher levels of privatization and marketization at 
the local level are related to higher levels of school segregation at the municipal level. As Bellei, 
Contreras, Cananles, & Orellana (2018) explain, market policies are not necessarily the origin of 
school segregation in Chile, but enough evidence exists to confirm that they have amplified the 
unequal socioeconomic distribution of students in schools.  
Research on the mechanisms that explain school segregation in the Chilean education system 
identifies both demand- and supply-side dynamics. Regarding the demand side of the market, studies 
show that school choice processes are significantly affected by social class and economic barriers. 
Student selection practices, school fees and even geographical barriers are important restrictions, 
which mainly affect poor families when it comes to choosing a school for their children (Alves et al., 
2015; Raczynski, Salinas, de la Fuente, Hernández, & Pascual, 2010; Rodriguez et al., 2016). On the 
other hand, research has also identified how upper- and middle-class families have access to different 
sources of information from low SES families (Elacqua & Fábrega, 2006). There are also important 
differences in terms of school choice preferences and choice criteria between middle and low SES 
families (Elacqua, Schneider, & Buckley, 2006).  
On the other hand, school competition has also been identified as driver of school 
segregation in the Chilean context for two main reasons. First, the adoption of a universal voucher 
 
 
4 Since the restoration of democracy (1990), the Chilean government has put in place different compensatory 
programs to improve the resources and the learning conditions of the worst schools. See Cox (2003) for a 
comprehensive review of these programs.  
5 The PISA index of social inclusion measures the level of socioeconomic heterogeneity in schools, with low 
values indicating fewer levels of social heterogeneity (OECD, 2013).  
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system and school choice have produced an important transfer of students from public to private 
subsidized schools, mainly from middle-income families, increasing the concentration of poor 
students in the public sector (Carnoy, 1998). Second, some schools have responded to competition 
incentives by selecting the best students and increasing the level of stratification between public and 
private schools (Contreras, Bustos, & Sepúlveda, 2010; Hseih & Urquiola, 2006). For Bellei (2007), 
the main hypothesis by which to explain this behavior is that, within the market framework, “schools 
can improve their market position without improving the quality of their educational service” (Bellei, 
2007p. 28). This hypothesis is based on the fact that schools can improve their academic 
performance without increasing the quality of the education service by recruiting the most 
academically able students. At the same time, the school population can act as an attraction to 
potential demand, since some parents do not necessarily base their choice on academic quality but on 
other attributes of a symbolic nature.   
Finally, it is important to take into account which role segregation plays in the Chilean 
education system from a more cultural point of view that, at least partially, can explain the extensive 
use of these practices among schools. In this sense, Falabella, Seppänen, & Raczynski (2015) point 
out how in Chile students’ selection practices enjoy higher levels of tolerance than in other countries. 
For the authors, this higher level of tolerance is rooted in a strong meritocratic belief in which 
selection practices are seen as a way to reward those children who deserve to be enrolled in higher 
status schools. The other factor, of a more material nature, highlighted by the authors to explain this 
tolerance is the need for social distinction in a highly socioeconomically stratified education system. 
The social composition of the school is a key factor for parents to guarantee the future educational 
and social success of their children. Hence, students’ selection is understood as a necessary practice 
to ensure that children with similar socioeconomic status are enrolled in the same school. Precisely, 
this greater tolerance for social injustice explains why in Chile families and schools are socially 
allowed to develop practices and strategies that foster and reinforce school social stratification. It is 
necessary to take into account this cultural dimension of school segregation when it comes to 
analyzing the mechanisms and logics of action developed by schools to produce social exclusion.  
In Chile, there is a large body of literature analyzing the impact of school choice and 
competition on areas such as effectiveness and equity. However, research on actors’ logics of action 
and mechanisms that explain these impacts is still relatively scarce. Moreover, the differences in 
preferences and patterns of school choice between low SES students and other social groups, which 
have been well documented (Bonal et al., 2017; Canales, Bellei, & Orellana, 2016; Carrasco, Falabella, 
& Mendóza, 2015), as well as how schools respond to competition, are essential factors in 
understanding the mechanisms of social exclusion that particularly affect the poorest students. In 
fact, the available evidence indicates that, in Chile, as in other contexts, pro-market policies 
drastically influence the practices developed by schools (Carrasco & Fromm, 2016; Verger et al., 
2016b).  
Data and Methods  
The findings presented in this article are based on case studies developed in two 
municipalities of Chile. Both are urban municipalities with between 300,000 and 350,000 inhabitants. 
Due to the importance of the local dimension when analyzing the dynamics of education markets 
(Gewirtz et al., 1995; Lubienski, 2007; Woods, Bagley, & Glatter, 1998), both municipalities were 
selected as they represent relatively closed local education markets (LEMs). Despite school choice 
boundaries not existing in Chile, data from the CASEN-2013 Chilean household survey showed that 
the number of primary education students enrolled in schools in both municipalities who actually live 
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in the municipality is high in both cases (94.8% in Municipality A and 86.9% in Municipality B). At 
the same time, the percentage of the population living in both municipalities but attending school in 
a different municipality is relatively low (7% in Municipality A and 9.3% in Municipality B). In both 
cases, the diversity of education providers in terms of ownership was relatively high in both 
municipalities. In Municipality A, the percentage of schools and enrollment by type of school is 
relatively similar to the national average, with 36.3% of students enrolled in public schools, 57.7% in 
private subsidized schools and 6% in private independent schools. In the case of Municipality B, the 
level of enrollment in public schools is relatively low (18.7%) in comparison with the national 
average (40.4%), which translates into an increase in the proportion of the private subsidized sector 
(74.1%).   
The fieldwork was developed in different phases between May 2014 and November 2015. A 
representative sample of schools was selected in each municipality based on three main attributes: 
typology (public, private subsidized, private independent), level of school fee, performance in the 
national assessment (see Appendix, table A-1, for the main characteristics included in the sample). 
Finally, 17 schools were selected in Municipality A, while the sample of schools in Municipality B 
consisted of 14 schools. In-depth interviews with school principals (lasting around 1.5 hours) and 
short interviews with families (between 20 and 30 minutes) were carried out. Table 1 summarizes the 
number of interviews with principals and parents by school typology in each municipality. 
Qualitative data have been complemented with a statistical analysis of the SIMCE parents survey6 of 
all the schools included in the sample. 
 
Table 1 
Principals’ and parents’ interviews by school typology and municipality 
 Typology of school  
Municipality Interviews Public Private subsidized Private Total 
Municipality A 
Principals 6 9 2 17 
Parents 16 37 17 70 
Municipality B 
Principals 3 9 2 14 
Parents 5 27 7 39 
 
The analysis of the collected qualitative data consisted of transcribing and coding the 
interviews with school principals and parents on different categories of school responses (e.g., 
contextual factors, pedagogical diversification, selection practices, academic performance, external 
communication). Due to the focus of this article being on school responses, the main source of 
information during the process of analysis was the interviews with school principals, while parents’ 
interviews were used to triangulate the analysis. Since schools are the main unit of analysis, they were 
classified according to the SES of their students. However, the socioeconomic classification of 
schools also considered the local context. For each school, the average SES of students was 
estimated, and schools were classified into five categories (low, lower-middle, middle, upper-middle 
 
 
6 The national quality assessment (abbreviated as SIMCE in Spanish) is an external performance test 
administered annually among different grades. In this research, the fourth-grade assessment was analyzed, 
which also included a survey of parents about their socioeconomic characteristics, as well as the relationship 
with the school.   
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and upper) depending on the distance, in terms of standard deviations, to the local students’ SES 
average.  
Schools’ Responses to the Education Market and Exclusion 
As in other contexts (Fiske & Ladd, 2001; Jabbar, 2015; Woods et al., 1998), the analysis of 
the two case studies shows that schools develop responses in six main dimensions: market scanning, 
establishment of school fees, school diversification, student selection, marketing, and academic 
performance improvement (mainly through teaching to the test practices). The focus of this section 
is to analyze how some of these responses can produce processes by which socioeconomically 
disadvantaged students are excluded. School fees and schools’ student selection practices are among 
the main forms of exclusion identified by previous literature. However, the analysis carried out in the 
current study highlights that schools’ means of excluding socioeconomically disadvantaged students 
are diverse and not always related to explicit and direct mechanisms. Frequently, semiotics plays an 
important role in preventing low SES students from enrolling at a particular school. In this respect, 
schools’ behaviors in terms of diversification or marketing can become important mechanisms of 
exclusion.  
From the school responses collected during the course of this research, it is possible to 
identify two main categories of mechanisms through which schools are able to influence and 
determine their school population, so as to exclude specific profiles of students or families and 
attracting others. On the one hand, there are hard mechanisms of exclusion, which refer to 
conditions of access imposed by schools and directly affect the capacity of low SES students to 
enroll. In the Chilean education system, hard mechanisms of exclusion involve the level of 
mandatory school fees charged to families and the explicit processes of student selection, such as 
entrance examinations. On the other hand, soft mechanisms are more related to semiotics (e.g., 
symbols, values, codes) and also prevent low SES students from applying to a particular school.  In 
contrast, soft mechanisms involve the values and codes disseminated through school diversification 
or external communication. Through soft mechanisms of exclusion, schools seek to appeal to 
middle- and upper-class family codes, values and preferences. Since low SES families and middle- 
and upper-class families report very different choice preferences, a focus on meeting the preferences 
of the most socioeconomically advantaged families can exclude poor families in an indirect way. 
However, soft mechanisms of exclusion are not necessarily the result of conscious strategies 
developed by the schools, but rather the result of their logics of action in a market environment (Ball 
& Maroy, 2009; van Zanten, 2009). This section analyses in depth, how both hard and soft 
mechanisms of social exclusion operate and under what rationalities schools develop them.  
School Fees: Segmenting the Market 
One of the main hard mechanisms producing social exclusion in the context of the Chilean 
education market is the capacity of schools to impose mandatory school fees on families (Elacqua et 
al., 2013). In fact, Chile is a singular case since public and private subsidized schools received the 
same amount of public funding but schools are allowed to charge fees to families (Boeskens, 2016). 
In primary education, only private subsidized schools are allowed to charge fees, which is combined 
with a progressive reduction in public funding  if the fees are more than the 50% of the total amount 
of the public funds received (Kutscher, 2014). Although public secondary schools are legally allowed 
to charge families mandatory fees, only a few of them do so. Different studies have shown how fees 
reinforce schools’ social stratification dynamics, since poor families cannot afford the high level of 
fees of some schools (Raczynski et al., 2010). The possibility to charge mandatory school fees was 
approved in Chile in the mid-1990s, based on the argument that it would give families the capacity to 
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financially contribute to the education of their children and increase the level of financial resources 
available to the education system (Beyer, 2015). However, there exists a certain level of contradiction 
between the use of vouchers, as a way to facilitate access for all students to private schools, and the 
use of school fees, which act as a restriction, particularly for low-income families (Epple, Romano, & 
Urquiola, 2015).  
In the case of the private subsidized schools analyzed, seven out of nine schools in 
Municipality A and six out of nine in Municipality B charged their students mandatory fees. As 
expected, data for the two analyzed LEMs show that there is a significant relationship between the 
level of school fees and the average SES of the school population. Table 2 presents the distribution 
of schools by the average SES of their students and the level of school fees. It is possible to observe 
in the graphic that, as the average SES of the school population increases, the higher the percentage 
of schools charge fees, as well as the higher the amount of these fees. 
 
Table 2  
School fees level by school students’ SES average (%). 
  School fees (Chilean pesos)  
 
School SES 
average Free 
1.000 
to 
10.000 
10.001 
to 
25.000 
25.001 
to 
50.000 
50.001 
to 
100.000 
More 
than 
100.000 Total 
Municipality 
A 
Low 100 0 0 0 0 0 100 
Medium-low 69.1 9.1 20 1.8 0 0 100 
Medium 4.2 0 25 54.2 16.6 0 100 
Medium-high 0 0 11.1 44.5 44.4 0 100 
High 0 0 0 0 28.6 71.4 100 
Municipality 
B 
Low 83.3 16.7 0 0 0 0 100 
Medium-low 32.6 6.5 41.3 17.4 2.2 0 100 
Medium 0 0 9.4 62.5 28.1 0 100 
Medium-high 0 0 0 10 70 20 100 
High 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 
Source: Own elaboration based on Mineduc statistics. Although it fluctuates frequently, the rate of exchange between US 
dollars and Chilean pesos (CLP) is approximately $1 USD=$724.5 CLP. Regarding the intervals of school fees presented 
in the table, this means: 1000-10,000 CLP=1.38-13.8 USD; 10,001-25,000 CLP=1.38-34.5 USD; 25,001-50,000 
CLP=34.5-69 USD; 50,001-100,000 CLP=69-138 USD; More than 100,000 CLP= More than 138 USD. 
 
Although school principals do not directly recognize the use of school fees as a way to 
exclude students7, they are aware of how it determines the socioeconomic profile of families that the 
school is able to attract and how it influences the socioeconomic background of their school 
population. For example, when school principals are asked about whom are their most direct 
competitors in the LEM, in the first place, they frequently refer to schools with the same level of 
school fees and sometimes how this is related to the academic profile of their school populations. In 
this sense, school fees are the main driver of education market segmentation on both the supply and 
 
 
7 Unfortunately, the majority of school principals interviewed confirmed that the level of school fees was set 
several years ago before they were in charge at the school.  
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the demand sides. It is openly assumed  by principals and families that schools’ fees levels are related 
to their students’ socioeconomic background. Interviews with families revealed that school fees are 
the main attribute that is considered when establishing their set of choices. Although some families 
were interested in schools that charged fees, they quickly discounted them because “they were too 
expensive, and I can’t afford them” (Mother, private subsided, Medium-low SES, Municipality B). 
This relationship between school fees, market segmentation and their targeted population is 
frequently reported by school principals. The next quote from a school principal shows how schools 
are aware of the capacity of school fees to define the potential population of families and students, as 
well as position their schools in the LEM.  
I believe that the population [that the school attracts] is of an average level 
because, in spite of being a private independent school, there are other private 
independent schools that are much more expensive. So, it is at a level that is a 
little higher than the private subsidized schools because the subsidized private 
sector can charge up to 75,000 pesos, more or less, and here we charge 120-
130,000. But there are others that are worth 250,000. It’s another level of income. 
(Principal, private independent school, Medium-high SES, Municipality A) 
 
Although, as explained above, there is no explicitly recognized strategy  regarding school fees, when 
school principals, who have recently established mandatory fees, were asked about the criterion to 
establish them, they referred to their ability  to retain families and attract new demand. For example, 
one of the analyzed private subsidized schools, which enrolls low- and lower-middle-class families, 
recently established cost sharing (previously it was free). This measure is justified by the school 
principal as a way to attract additional financial resources and improve their capacity to compete with 
other nearby schools that historically have charged fees to families.  When asked about the criterion 
to establish the fee level, the school principal only referred to the capacity to retain the current 
profile of families. 
Interviewer: What criteria did you use to establish the monthly payment? 
Principal: What can be paid. It can be waived in part, which means you can have 
an additional resource without meaning to strain families and let them go because 
they cannot pay. (Principal, private subsidized school, Medium SES, Municipality 
A) 
 
In 2008, the Chilean government approved a compensatory policy, which tried, among other aims, to 
reduce the effect of school fees as a barrier imposed on the most socioeconomically disadvantaged 
students. The Preferential School Subsidy8 (PSS) was a voluntary program for private subsidized 
schools by providing additional public funding for each socioeconomically disadvantaged student 
who enrolled. In turn, counterpart schools were not able to charge fees to these students, as well as 
being required to meet some accountability criteria. The available evidence on the impact of this 
policy on school segregation shows that it had no significant effect9 (Raczynski, Muñoz, Weinstein, 
& Pascual, 2013; Valenzuela, Villaroel, & Villalobos, 2013). As Elacqua & Santos (2013) 
demonstrate, the increase in resources as a result of enrolling low SES students is not enough of an 
 
 
8 Known in Spanish as Subvención Escolar Preferencial (abbreviated to SEP).  
9 However, the evidence also shows that this policy has been, on average, successful in increasing the 
academic performance of schools that enroll the most disadvantaged students and reducing the gap between 
public and private subsidized schools (Centro de Estudios Mineduc, 2012; Mizala & Torche, 2013). 
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incentive for schools and does not outweigh  the advantages of enrolling the most socioeconomically 
advantaged school population. In some cases, principals from schools attended by low SES students 
(mainly public, but also some private subsidized schools) even consider that PSS could have fostered 
the dynamics of school segregation. According to these principals, some private subsidized schools 
participating in the PSS program have tried to attract low SES students with good academic records, 
increasing the concentration of poor and less academically able students in public schools. This 
phenomenon is explained by the next principal as part of his personal experience since the PSS 
program was established.  
The private subsidized schools, which guide themselves by the issue of priority 
students, look for children with good [academic] performance and try to motivate 
them so that they will enroll in their schools, particularly those that have good 
performance (Principal, public school, Low SES, Municipality B) 
 
In this sense, school fees are not just an economic barrier for poor students to access some schools, 
but also a means by which schools influence their school population, in turn segmenting the LEM.  
Students Selection: Producing Exclusion and Auto-exclusion 
The second hard mechanism of exclusion identified is the use of students’ selection 
processes. Although student selection, based on academic performance or socioeconomic 
background, has been formally prohibited in schools receiving public funding (public and private 
subsidized) since 200910, it has been a common practice in Chile in recent decades. Research focused 
on this issue has revealed how selection practices are used by a significant percentage of schools, 
particularly private subsidized schools (Carrasco, Bogolasky, Flores, Gutiérrez, & San Martín, 2014; 
Contreras et al., 2010). In line with the existing evidence, this current study has also identified that 
student selection practices in the analyzed schools are among the most important mechanisms of 
exclusion. However, the collected evidence confirms that student selection is a complex practice in 
terms of use, nature, objectives and the degree to which it is carried out.  
Although some of the school principals interviewed recognized that the use of explicit 
processes of selection was relatively common (19 of 39 schools recognizes the use of student 
selection practices), the SIMCE parent survey allows us to complement the information obtained via 
interviews of school principals and to quantify the extent of these practices. Graphic 1 shows the 
percentage of schools analyzed in each municipality, in which at least 50% of parents confirm that 
their children have been required to sit entrance examinations or that student behavior in the 
classroom has been observed according to the average SES of schools. As the data contained in the 
graphic show, there is a positive relationship between the use of these explicit procedures of 
selection and the SES of the school population. While the majority of upper SES schools use these 
practices (85.7% in Municipality A and 100% in Municipality B), schools with the lowest SES 
average do not use any of these procedures.  
 
 
 
 
 
10 In 2009, the General Education Law (abbreviated to LGE in Spanish) prohibits the use of selection based 
on the current or potential academic performance of students, as well as their socioeconomic background, in 
primary education.  
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Figure 1. Schools using explicit selection methods by school students’ SES average (%) 
Source: Own elaboration based on SIMCE parents’ questioner. 
 
Despite the intensive use of explicit selection processes among upper and middle SES 
schools, the evidence collected shows that the ways in which schools develop these practices are 
diverse and do not necessarily entail the use of entrance examinations or observation sessions. 
School principals reported a broad variety of methods utilized to carry out student selection, as well 
as to promote auto-exclusion among socioeconomically disadvantaged students. It is important to 
consider that, since student selection practices were formally prohibited in 2009, the use of these 
procedures has been a controversial issue in the Chilean education system. As a result, some of the 
principals interviewed recognized the increasing use of practices oriented towards “auto-selection” or 
“auto-exclusion”. The objective of these practices is that some specific families exclude themselves 
during the process of application, thus avoiding the need for explicit practices of selection. Of 
course, the use of these procedures of auto-selection does not necessarily imply that these schools 
fail to apply explicit processes of selection later on, but rather that their incidence is reduced as a 
consequence. Three main procedures of auto-selection have been identified among some of the 
schools analyzed. First, some schools charge a fee as a requirement to be part of the process of 
application. Although this practice was not directly acknowledged by any of the principals 
interviewed, in the interviews with families explicit references were made to this application fee as a 
requirement to access schooling and some of the school websites also refer to it. Second, families are 
required to actively participate during the process of application. Some principals confirmed that they 
use extended processes of application, which entail school meetings, family workshops and other 
social activities for several months of the year before children start the school. The main objective of 
the extended process of application is to ensure that the family demonstrates real commitment to the 
school, as well as setting up the possibility for parents to withdraw their children from the process. 
Third, informative sessions are delivered in order to make clear that the school does not have the will 
or capacity to enroll children from low socioeconomic backgrounds or with special needs. The next 
quote from a school principal in Municipality A summarizes how information sessions seek to 
promote some level of auto-exclusion among certain families at the application stage.   
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So, what we do is to bring all the parents together at some point in the year, 
something that we have done already, and we tell them: “Look, this is who we 
are, are you sure you want your child to come here? We do not have this, we do 
not have this, and we do not have this other” [...]. We tell them, but the worst of 
it is to see if anyone leaves. (Principal, Medium SES, private subsidized school, 
Municipality A) 
 
In fact, this same school located some posters at the entrance of the building with explicit messages 
warning families of potential new students that the school charges fees (“we have cost sharing”), 
does not participate in the national program for socioeconomically disadvantaged students 
(Preferential School Subsidy)  (“the school is not part of the PSS program”) or even that it cannot 
support children with special needs (“we do not have professionals to attend to special education 
needs”). All of these messages are oriented towards preventing socioeconomically disadvantaged 
families and students from applying to the school, thereby avoiding the use of other forms of 
selection, such as interviews with families or entrance examinations.  
To understand the broad dissemination of these selection practices among the schools 
located in both LEMs, it is important to take into account how much parents tolerate and even 
request them. For parents, selection practices are a way to ensure some level of social closure. School 
principals are aware of how families value selection requirements when it comes to choosing school 
and sometimes they use parents’ attitude towards school selection as a justification for implementing 
student selection practices in their schools. On the other hand, interviews with families have shown 
how a certain level of social homogeneity is an important criterion of choice. As one mother argued, 
non-selective schools, mainly public schools, “are attended by people that maybe we don’t want, it’s 
not like discriminating against them, but we didn’t want that for our daughter” (Mother, Private 
subsidized school, Medium SES, Municipality A). In this sense, for some middle- and high-income 
families, school segregation and social stratification among schools is not just a feature of the Chilean 
education system but something desired in a relatively open way.    
Of note is the use of selection practices among schools already enrolling low SES and poorly 
performing students. In this case, selection practices are applied in an arbitrary manner with some of 
the students who come to the school to be enrolled. The use of selection in these schools is justified 
by school principals as a means to reduce the concentration of the most disadvantaged students in 
these schools, as the next quote summarizes: 
Now, what I am doing is trying to do a bit… is to slightly filter the students, 
which means that, when new students arrive, we at least intuit what kinds of 
marks they have because we are already full of vulnerable students and low 
performance. So, what we also have to do is to enroll some students with a good 
performance record who are not in that condition [of vulnerability], in order to 
level up, because we were leveling down. (Principal, private subsidized school, 
Low SES, Municipality B) 
  
In some way, these schools try to develop a de facto policy of desegregation due to the absence of an 
active public policy to reduce the high level of segregation in the Chilean educational system. They 
choose to adopt selection practices that allow them to reduce the concentration of socioeconomically 
disadvantaged students or those with very low academic performance. These practices have also 
been observed in some municipal schools that try to position themselves better in the market, 
despite the high level of vulnerability among the students they serve and their limited resources.  
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The perception and discourse of the majority of public schools’ principals regarding 
students’ selection compared to principals of private subsidized schools is also a point of interest. 
For them, their schools are asked to accomplish contradictory objectives as, on the one hand, they 
have to compete in the market with the other schools and, on the other, they need to have an 
inclusive orientation and enroll all profiles of students, including those expelled11 - mainly from 
private subsidized schools. These contradictory objectives, together with their lack of capacity to 
develop students’ selection practices, are experienced by public schools’ principals as a competitive 
disadvantage. The next quote from a municipal school principal summarizes this perception: 
Since we should not select students, we are at a disadvantage position because 
here we receive all the children who arrive. In the nearby subsidized schools, they 
select students and if the student repeats a course, he leaves the school. We 
cannot do that, here we have children who have repeated 2, 3 times the same 
course because they have learning difficulties, because they are alone, because 
their parents are in jail. So, we have here very different realities, as well as 
children who are really great. So, what can we do? You have to try to work for 
different levels, for different realities, and that is hard. […] And of course, we 
never can put ourselves at the level of a private subsidized school. (Principal, 
public school, Low SES, Municipality B) 
Diversification of School Policies and Practices: Excluding and Attracting the Poor 
The promotion of the diversification of school policies and practices is one of the objectives 
associated with the adoption of market policies (Levin, 1991). In this case, school diversification 
refers to the capacity of schools to differentiate what they offer based on curricular, pedagogical, 
religious or value approaches among other possible attributes. Education market theory expects that 
schools seek to develop pedagogical policies and practices, based on the preferences of families and 
students, with the objective of attracting them. However, among other aims, diversification is 
frequently used as a way to attract specific profiles of students, as well as exclude others. Since 
school diversification is often not necessarily related to the pedagogical dimension, symbolic 
attributes are often used to distinguish between schools amongst highly competitive LEMs. In fact, it 
is frequently the case that these symbolic attributes do not necessarily involve substantive changes in 
the daily practices of schools but are more related to the social codes valued by the targeted 
population of the schools (Lubienski, 2003). As in other contexts, the evidence available in the case 
of Chile demonstrates that market policies have not been successful in significantly increasing the 
levels of pedagogical diversification (Gauri, 1998; Ministerio de Educación, 2012; Villalobos & 
Salazar, 2014). However, the analysis carried out over the course of the current study has allowed us 
to identify other typologies of diversification, which combine pedagogical and non-pedagogical 
dimensions, as well as substantive and symbolic attributes. For the schools analyzed in both LEMs, 
the typologies identified were: social distinction, academic performance, alternative pedagogy, 
security, school climate, individual attention or special needs. Although an in-depth discussion of 
these typologies of diversification is beyond the scope of this paper, this section describes how 
diversification can become a soft mechanism of exclusion and how some of the typologies identified 
foster processes of exclusion. The relationship between diversification and social exclusion is not 
 
 
11 Student expulsion is not analysed in this paper, mainly because of the lack of evidence to weight the 
importance of this phenomenon, due to the very controversial nature of the issue in Chile. It is worth 
mentioning that traditionally it has been a relatively common practice in the Chilean education system and 
frequently reported by public schools’ principals.  
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unidirectional. While, for some schools, their diversification strategy is a means to attract families 
from the middle and upper classes, thereby excluding low-class families, for other schools, 
diversification is used to reinforce their market niches based on enrollment among poor populations, 
which increases the prevalence of socioeconomic segregation.  
The most direct way in which exclusion takes place through school diversification involves 
schools that tailor their policies and practices as a way to offer a certain level of social distinction to 
families (4 out of 39 schools analyzed). This means that the main attribute used by these schools to 
attract families is their social composition, which is always in the form of middle- and upper-class 
students. In a way, the main attraction of these schools is social exclusivity, alongside a certain level 
of social closure as the main selling point in order to increase demand for their school. The majority 
of families interviewed connected with these schools refer to the social composition of the school as 
the first and main choice criterion. These families value the fact that their children have the 
opportunity to  be in contact with other students from a similar or higher SES background during 
their schooling. Principals from these schools recognized the importance that the school social 
composition plays in attracting families. The next quote from a school principal, who was asked 
about the main point of attraction, summarizes how social distinction works as a diversification 
strategy and how families openly value the capacity of these schools to provide a socially 
homogenous environment:   
[Families] come here because the father was a student here, or his friends at the 
university were students of the school, or their co-workers, who like what they 
like, how they work, are former students of the school, or because they have co-
workers who have their children here and they have already told them about it. 
So, now, what do they tell us? What do they like about the school? They want 
these types of parents that I tell you about. (Principal, private independent 
school, High SES, Municipality A)  
 
Another more indirect way to produce exclusion through diversification is appealing to the 
preferences and values of middle- and upper-class families. For example, an educational project 
based on alternative pedagogy (2 out of 39 schools analyzed) is attractive to some middle-class 
families, as well as acting as a way of excluding low SES families. Alternative pedagogy has been 
classified as any school that mainly uses non-directive teaching methods (e.g., Montessori or 
Waldorf). The interviews with families showed that some middle- and upper-class families look for 
and value these types of pedagogical approaches in order to avoid traditional pedagogies and 
methods of teaching, which, for them, are associated with the majority of Chilean schools. In 
contrast, lower-middle and low-class families value more discipline or security and therefore 
disregard schools based on alternative pedagogical approaches, since they perceive them to be less 
aligned with their choice preferences. Principals are aware of how their pedagogical approach has the 
capacity to attract a specific profile of students and, as a consequence, exclude others. In fact, the 
next quote from a principal of one of these schools summarizes how he has established a 
relationship between the alternative pedagogy approach of the school and the socioeconomic profile 
of families that the school is able to attract.     
[The profile of families with students at this school] is that of progressive young 
professionals. I say progressive because they don’t belong to the conservative 
tradition. They are also a product of capitalist modernity in Chile because they are 
part of a rising middle class, which has been promoted by neoliberal policies and 
also have a critical view on this reality [...] I think that they come here because of 
the search for a different project, which is more innovative in these areas, mainly 
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because of the authoritarianism that is highly present in Chilean schools. 
(Principal, private subsidized school, High SES, Municipality B) 
 
Principals of schools according to this typology of diversification openly recognize that their school 
tries to reinforce the diversification project through the use of symbols and ideological or political 
references, which are valued by the targeted profile of families. In fact, interviews with families 
whose children attend these schools show that they often refer to symbolic attributes related to more 
open teaching methods, such as the absence of uniforms or the lack of a dress code, but that they are 
not able to provide a specific discourse about the pedagogical approach of the respective school. 
School principals are aware of the importance of these symbolic attributes in creating processes of 
self-selection and self-exclusion. 
[…] that discourse is constructed so that a dad says: “Here, I am fine”. But 
someone who does not share this approach excludes himself because the 
educational project in action is saying to him this is not for me.” (Principal, 
private subsidized school, High SES, Municipality B) 
 
On the other side of the education market, it is possible to identify some schools that have 
developed a niche in the market for low SES families, as one of the school principals recognized: 
“We attend to the vulnerable students and we are very happy with doing it” (principal, public school, 
Municipality A). These schools are aware that the main attributes valued by socioeconomically 
disadvantaged families are highly influenced by the context in which they live. These schools do not 
focus their diversification approach on pedagogical issues but on aspects related to the school 
climate, security or discipline. For this typology of schools, symbolic factors also play an important 
role in defining their diversification strategy.  
Basically, here, what prevails is security, that is, people here, in fact, come here 
and say: “We are going to put it in this school because it is a safe school.” This 
already gives us an insight into what people are looking for, because it is safe. 
They live in an environment of insecurity, then they feel that the school is a safe 
place for their children, in this environment, in this school. [...] It’s a safe school, 
so suddenly some parents feel that it’s safer for them to be here at school, rather 
than at home. (Principal, private subsidized school, Medium-low SES, 
Municipality B) 
 
The fact that these schools develop diversification responses oriented towards attracting the most 
disadvantaged students is the expected result from a highly socioeconomically segmented LEM, 
present in both the municipalities analyzed. However, despite this being considered a part of the 
rationale of the schools, this specific approach fosters the dynamics of school social segregation.  
Marketing: Reinforcing Exclusion 
Finally, marketing practices developed by schools can also act as soft mechanisms of 
exclusion. In this context, marketing is understood as activities and initiatives developed by the 
school to communicate with potential applicants but also with families already enrolled in the school 
(Oplatka & Hemsley-Brown, 2004). Educational marketing, particularly in basic education, 
overcomes the traditional activities of advertising and entails a “wide and dynamic range of external 
relationships” (Foskett, 2002). Marketing, or the way in which schools communicate with the 
external environment, can play a crucial role in attracting specific families and students, as well as 
excluding others. Studies focused on marketing activities developed by schools, mainly in the U.S. 
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context, show that marketing is not just a way to attract new families and students, but also a 
mechanism used to limit access to low SES students or other minorities (Jabbar, 2016; Lubienski & 
Lee, 2016; Wilson & Carlsen, 2016). School marketing is a means by which to produce school 
“glossification” (Gewirtz et al., 1995), which entails the generation and dissemination of a specific 
school image. Of course, school marketing is intensely related to the diversification responses 
developed by schools (Zancajo, 2018). Frequently, marketing becomes the main method by which 
schools communicate with their more closed external environment and therefore an effective tool to 
attract specific profiles of families.   
The evidence collected for the two LEMs analyzed shows that the intense use of marketing 
and promotional activities (e.g., flyers, posters, newspaper ads) is more common among schools with 
shortfalls in terms of demand, that is, schools that mainly enroll low SES students. These schools 
develop an extended marketing strategy in order to make themselves visible in a highly competitive 
education market and attract new demand, without a specific targeted population. Although there is a 
relationship between the use of marketing responses and the socioeconomic level of the school 
population, schools enrolling middle- and upper-class students also develop activities of marketing 
which have two key objectives: on the one hand, reinforcing the school image based on their 
diversification strategy; on the other hand, orienting their marketing activities to attract a specific 
target group of students by reinforcing their market niches. For example, some of the schools 
analyzed have established partnerships with preschools as way to attract their desired target 
population. These schools identify preschool educational institutions with a middle- and high-class 
population and try to establish a partnership with them in order to promote their school  in these 
environments via flyers or presentations to parents of children in the preschools. Other common 
behavior related to marketing activities in these schools is to only advertise schools in areas of the 
municipality where middle- and upper-class families are concentrated.  
In terms of school marketing, websites are acquiring an important role in schools’ marketing. 
In the case of Municipality A, 8 out of 17 schools have a webpage, while, in Municipality B, 8 out of 
14 schools have one. The existence of a webpage is more common in schools enrolling middle and 
high SES students. Interviews with families show that mainly middle- and upper-class families use 
school websites when putting together their initial choice set, alongside asking relatives and friends 
for information or visiting the school. In fact, school principals report that the content of their 
websites is sometimes used to produce self-selection or self-exclusion. Of course, this phenomenon 
is related to the diversification typology, but acts as an initial filter for families, as the next quote 
from a school principal makes clear.  
Interviewer: Do you feel that some families check the website and, based on the 
information they find there, come to the school?  
Principal: Parents should ask themselves: “Is this for me or not?” (Principal, 
private subsidized school, Medium-high SES, Municipality B) 
Discussion 
As the article has shown in the case of the Chilean education market, processes and 
mechanisms that foster exclusion and school segregation take place in very different ways. In terms 
of the main focus of this article, the supply side, it has been possible to identify hard mechanisms of 
exclusion (i.e., school fees and student selection), as well as soft mechanisms, which produce 
exclusion in a more indirect way. While hard mechanisms of exclusion are relatively easy to detect, 
soft mechanisms, managed through marketing and the diversification of school policies and 
practices, act in a subtler manner, reinforcing the capacity of schools to attract specific profiles of 
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students and excluding others, mainly based on their socioeconomic background. In an education 
market context, semiotics plays an important role in the responses developed by schools to the 
incentives of competition. To a certain extent, it is not necessary to develop explicit processes of 
exclusion, but to appeal to the values and preferences of middle- and high-class families in order to 
attract them, while excluding other social groups that do not identify themselves with these cultural 
codes. Soft mechanisms of exclusion are not always the result of a conscious and explicit rationality 
or even strategy of schools; rather, they are an essential orientation of their logic of action when 
enacting market policies. As a consequence, it is difficult to discern to what extent processes of 
exclusion developed by some schools are the result of opportunistic behaviors or the inevitable 
consequence of their response to the incentives of a competitive environment.  
The debate on the effects of privatization and pro-market policies has traditionally been 
controversial and highly ideological. Over the last three decades these policies have expanded across 
the world, still a relevant academic and political discussion is still taking place on how market-
oriented policies impact on different dimensions, such as effectiveness, efficiency and equity. 
However, nowadays, there is a relative international consensus on the fact that, under some 
circumstances and policy designs, privatization and market policies could have a negative impact on 
equity12. Especially in the case of southern countries, the research has shown how these negative 
consequences particularly affect socioeconomically disadvantage populations or ethnic minorities, 
fostering processes of school segregation and marginalization. In recent years this consensus has 
transcended the academic sphere and relevant international organizations have expressed concerns 
about the possible unintended consequences of these policies, particularly in terms of equity and for 
socioeconomically disadvantaged students. For example, the OECD has warned that voucher 
schemes and school competition can increase the socioeconomic stratification of schools and 
educational inequalities (OECD, 2012a, 2014). The 2017/18 edition of the UNESCO Global 
Education Monitoring Report points out that more regulation is needed to avoid opportunistic 
behavior on the part of private providers and  negative effects of this on equity (UNESCO, 2017). 
Even the World Bank, traditionally an advocate of market-based solutions, recognizes in its 2018 
World Development Report that, in some cases, the rapid expansion of private provision can “undermine 
the political constituency for effective public schooling in the longer term” (World Bank, 2018, p. 
177). Therefore, the World Bank recommends the development of effective regulatory frameworks 
to avoid discrimination and ensure that all providers pursue the public interest.  
Independent of the controversy surrounding market solutions, a debate about regulation has 
emerged in response to processes of exclusion and negative impacts on equity. This relatively recent 
trend shows a significant change in the narrative and discourses of international organizations around 
the role of private providers and market mechanisms in education. After several decades of global 
expansion of these policies, nowadays concerns about the effects these policies have on equity have 
grown. In part, this recent trend can be explained as international evidence has shown how, up to a 
point, national education systems must improve equity as a way of making gains in terms of 
educational quality and performance (OECD, 2012b). Evidence on privatization and market policies 
not only show how these policies are not able to improve equity, but also how in some countries the 
 
 
12 For example, in 2014 the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to education released a report 
warning about the negative consequences on social justice and equity of the increasing expansion of 
educational private provision worldwide. According to the report, these negative effects are mainly explained 
by “abusive practices” developed by some private providers (UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Education, 2014).  
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involvement of private providers and the adoption of market mechanisms have led to the exclusion 
and marginalization of socially disadvantaged students.  
However, given the evidence presented in this paper, as well as in other research, there are  
reasonable doubts about the capacity of new regulative frameworks or accountability devices to 
avoid the unintended consequences of pro-market and privatization policies. In contexts where 
market mechanisms, such as school choice and competition, still play a central role, it may be 
questioned whether it is possible to reduce the negative equity effects without  significantly altering 
these mechanisms. In some cases, international organizations are advocating for higher levels of 
regulation or the establishment of accountability measures to avoid or reduce opportunistic 
behaviors with negative effects on equity. Yet, as this paper has shown: mechanisms of exclusion are 
complex; they can act in a subtle way (soft mechanisms of exclusion); it is not always possible to 
regulate them; and in some cases actors can even develop, more informally, other forms of exclusion. 
Here, the evidence available seems to show that market mechanisms of coordination, choice and 
competition, ensure that educational actors face a structure of incentives that can contradict the 
objectives of educational inclusion. 
The debate around the capacity of markets and other forms of PPPs to foster educational 
equity and inclusion transcends the particular case of Chile. In the context of the new Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs; UN, 2015), in which the promotion of equitable education systems has 
acquired a central role, the capacity of pro-market policies to achieve educational equity objectives is 
open to question. Although different International Organizations have promoted the establishment 
of partnerships between the public and the private sectors or the adoption of choice and competition 
as a way to achieve the SDGs, the evidence has repeatedly shown how these interventions cannot 
only perpetuate existing inequalities but also increase them. Recently, organizations such as the 
World Bank or UNESCO (UNECO, 2017; World Bank, 2018) have pointed out the need for new 
regulations or the establishment of accountability devices to ensure that private providers’ practices 
or market mechanisms do not produce negative effects in terms of equity. However, the 
effectiveness of these proposals to deal with the negative effects on equity is still uncertain. 
The effectiveness of education market regulations or compensatory policies to avoid negative 
effects regarding equity would depend on their capacity to grasp and deal with the demand- and 
supply-side mechanisms that produce exclusion and school segregation. In this sense, research on 
school choice policies has provided a large amount of necessary evidence  to help understand the 
different patterns and rationalities developed by families when choosing a school. What is more, the 
academic literature has revealed how different social groups enact school choice policies in various 
forms depending on their socioeconomic background, and how this affects the equity (Ball, 2003; 
Canales et al., 2016; Schneider et al., 2000). That said, how educational providers are able to create 
processes of exclusion is still relatively under-analyzed. The evidence presented in this article shows 
that supply-side mechanisms of social exclusion are diverse and complex. Despite the hard 
mechanisms of exclusion, such as student selection and school fees, other mechanisms of a softer 
nature can also produce and reinforce the processes of exclusion. In particular, semiotics, in this case 
related to diversification and school marketing, can be effective in attracting specific profiles of 
families and students, as well as sometimes excluding socioeconomically disadvantaged students. 
Education market regulations, which are oriented towards compensating for the dynamics of school 
segregation and exclusion, need to consider how both demand and supply sides enact market policies 
beyond the expected responses according to education market theory.  
Chile is nowadays a paradigmatic case for exploring the possibilities and effects of market 
regulation in a highly unequal education market. In 2015, the Chilean government passed a new 
education reform (the Inclusion Act), which mainly prohibits student selection practices, school fees 
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in publicly funded schools and for-profit schools in primary and secondary education (Bellei, 2016), 
with the objective of improving educational opportunities and reducing school segregation. Although 
this new regulation will be progressively implemented over the coming years, during which time its 
effects need to be evaluated, this represents a significant opportunity, on a national scale, to analyze 
the strengths and shortcomings of regulation in promoting equity and educational opportunities for 
all students in an education market framework. On the other hand, despite the policy design of this 
reform, knowing how educational actors (mainly schools and families) enact the new legal framework 
will be essential in determining the extent of its effects. However, the extent to which it is possible to 
foster educational inclusion and to reduce the level of social stratification in a market environment 
remains unclear. In an education market context, to influence the behavior of actors, competitive 
incentives can be more powerful than regulations or focused policies that try to promote inclusion. 
In a competitive environment, regulation aimed at encouraging inclusive practices through per capita 
funding, school choice and dissemination of test results can fail to alter the traditional exclusion 
practices developed by actors. Thus, the educational reform adopted in Chile since 2015 is not only 
informative regarding the capacity of the law to improve educational inclusion, but also about the 
feasibility of improving it when the education market’s main features, choice and competition, have 
not been significantly altered. Finally, the Chilean experience could also provide evidence of the 
capacity of the reform, and particularly the policy and public discussion around inclusion, to alter the 
existing cultural and social tolerance towards social exclusion and school segregation. 
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Appendix 
Table A-1 
Main characteristics of schools included in the sample 
 SIMCE average 
performance 
(4th grade) 
 
Code and school type Religious orientation PSS
a Cost-
sharing 
Fee 
(Chilean 
pesos) 
SES 
averageb 
La
ng
ua
ge
 
M
at
he
m
at
ic
s 
N
at
ur
al
 
sc
ie
nc
es
 
M
un
ici
pa
lit
y 
A
 
Public school 1 Secular Yes NA Free Medium-
low 
217 243 229 
Public school 2 Secular Yes NA Free Medium-
low 
212 203 213 
Public school 3 Secular Yes NA Free Low 213 219 228 
Public school 4 Secular Yes NA Free Medium-
low 
238 236 234 
Public school 5 Secular Yes NA Free Medium-
low 
247 237 236 
Public school 6 Secular Yes NA Free Medium-
low 
252 246 246 
Private subsidized 
school 7 
Catholic Yes No Free Medium-
low 
280 258 261 
Private subsidized 
school 8 
Secular Yes No Free Medium-
low 
248 252 229 
Private subsidized 
school 9 
Secular Yes Yes 25.001 – 
50.000 
Medium-
high 
262 255 270 
Private subsidized 
school 10 
Evangelical No Yes 25.001 – 
50.000 
Medium 287 255 261 
Private subsidized 
school 11 
Catholic No Yes 25.001 – 
50.000 
Medium 260 272 273 
Private subsidized 
school 12 
Catholic Yes Yes 25.001 – 
50.000 
Medium 289 292 291 
Private subsidized 
school 13 
Catholic No Yes 10.001 – 
25.000 
Medium 301 294 278 
Private subsidized 
school 14 
Evangelical Yes Yes 50.001 – 
100.000 
Medium 204 181 212 
Private subsidized 
school 15 
Secular No Yes 50.001 – 
100.000 
High 290 283 283 
Private school 16 Secular No NA 50.001 – 
100.000 
Medium-
high 
267 240 244 
Private school 17 Secular No NA More 
than 
100.000 
High 304 298 307 
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a Preferential School Subsidy (PSS) is a programme, voluntary for private subsidized schools, which allocates extra funds 
for each low-income student enrolled in the school. The participation of the school in this program can be understood as 
a proxy of its school population socioeconomic status.  
b SES of the school was calculated as the average of students’ SES, which has been estimated based on the following 
variables: level of family income, father’s education, mother’s education, and number of books at home.   
NA: Not Applicable (public schools were not allowed to charge fees and private schools were not part of the cost-sharing 
scheme).  
 
Table A-1 cont. 
Main characteristics of schools included in the sample 
 
      SIMCE average 
performance 
(4th grade) 
 Code and school type Religious orientation PSS
a Cost-sharing 
Fee 
(Chilean 
pesos) 
SES 
averageb 
La
ng
ua
ge
 
M
at
he
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at
ic
s  
N
at
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sc
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M
un
ici
pa
lit
y 
B 
Public school 18 Secular Yes NA Free Low 252 247 244 
Public school 19 Secular Yes NA Free Low 243 228 238 
Public school 20 Secular Yes NA Free Low 251 232 222 
Private subsidized 
school 21 
Secular Yes No Free Low 238 218 221 
Private subsidized 
school 22 
Evangelical Yes No Free Medium-
low 
244 219 232 
Private subsidized 
school 23 
Secular Yes No Free Medium-
low 
224 216 217 
Private subsidized 
school 24 
Catholic Yes Yes 25.001 – 
50.000 
Medium 277 255 259 
Private subsidized 
school 25 
Secular No Yes 25.001 – 
50.000 
Medium 261 234 254 
Private subsidized 
school 26 
Catholic No Yes 50.001 – 
100.000 
Medium-
high 
309 291 292 
Private subsidized 
school 27 
Catholic No Yes 50.001 – 
100.000 
Medium 300 285 283 
Private subsidized 
school 28 
Secular No Yes 50.001 – 
100.000 
Medium-
high 
267 263 264 
Private subsidized 
school 29 
Secular No Yes 50.001 – 
100.000 
Medium-
high 
286 294 304 
Private school 30 Catholic No NA More 
than 
100.000 
High 282 266 278 
Private school 31 Secular No NA More 
than 
100.000 
High 318 325 323 
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